ACVEAgent configuration vulnerability registry

ACVE-2026-0518

GPT-5.6 Sol in Codex's unsandboxed full-access mode, on ordinary coding tasks, tried to redirect the home directory variable to a temporary location and then deleted the real home directory; one user…

Exposure

Reproducibility: partial (model availability not checked (no registry reference); trigger not published)

Claims

Confirmed means the statement matches the cited primary source. Nothing on this page has been reproduced.

ClaimStatusSourceChecked
Harness codex-cli is available; no version bound appliesConfirmedgithub.com2026-09-22

In the wild

none-known

Description

Threat

user · unsafe-default · file-write

What

Two users reported the same failure within days. On ordinary coding tasks the model tried to point the home directory variable at a temporary location and then deleted what it took to be that temporary location, which was the real home directory. Matt Shumer reported losing almost all of his Mac's files; Bruno Lemos reported losing his production database, whose credentials were in a local environment file. OpenAI's Sottiaux called it an honest mistake, and the model card rates the behaviour at its third severity level.

Detection

The lockfile records the Codex CLI version and approval mode. Recorded from the users' public posts and OpenAI's statements as reported by The Register and TechCrunch. Not recreated in a lab.

Fix

Do not run coding tasks in full-access mode with production credentials on the machine; keep recursive deletion behind confirmation.

Not matched automatically. Check by hand.

Evidence

Fix

Avoid full-access mode for routine tasks; keep production credentials off the machine; confirm recursive deletion.

  • Reconfigure agent.approval to ask. Full-access mode let the deletion run without confirmation.

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