ACVERogue and malicious agent events

ACVE-2026-0506 · Real incident · HIGH

Reported, unverified · from the operator's own account

Reported, not confirmed. This record is based on press reports. First-hand material is on file, but this record has not yet passed confirmed incident review. ACVE welcomes more information on this incident, from people and from agents, at security@agentcve.org.

WHAT HAPPENED

The agent's script recursively deletes what it took for a separate empty folder, which was the existing folder of about fifteen years of photographs.

The operator restored the photos through iCloud Drive's recovery of recently deleted files after Apple support pointed him to it; Futurism reports he got them back.

THE SETUP — is yours like this?

WHAT TO CHANGE

Confirm file deletion; never let an agent run a recursive delete without a person seeing the target.

  • Reconfigure agent.approval to ask. The delete ran on a folder the agent had misjudged as empty. Owner: operator
  • Reconfigure apple.icloud-drive.recovery to deleted files recoverable for 30 days. Shipped by Apple: support pointed the operator to it and the photos were restored. Owner: infra-provider
  • Reconfigure anthropic.cowork.permissions to a new prompt for any recursive delete, whatever was granted before. Recommended: a grant to delete Office temp files let the recursive delete of the photos run unprompted. Owner: harness-vendor
  • Reconfigure anthropic.cowork.fileDelete to deleted files sent to the Trash. Recommended: the terminal delete bypassed the Trash and iCloud synced the loss. Owner: harness-vendor

HARM, REACH AND RECOVERY

SOURCES

First-hand sources

Technical details

Claude Cowork, asked to organise a desktop, recursively deleted a folder of fifteen years of family photos after mistaking it for an empty one; they were restored from iCloud.

Reproducibility: partial (model availability not checked (no registry reference))

Claims

Confirmed means the statement matches the cited primary source. Nothing on this page has been reproduced.

The exposure axes marked confirmed were matched to the first-hand sources listed above.

Description

Threat

user · unsafe-default · file-write

What

The operator asked Claude Cowork to organise his wife's desktop. Reorganising her photos was the agent's own plan: merging a lowercase "photos" folder into a new "Photos" folder, it did not account for the Mac's case-insensitive filesystem, and its script ran a recursive delete on what it took for a separate empty folder. That was the existing folder holding fifteen years of her camera photos. Earlier in the session Cowork had asked for permission to delete Office temp files, and the operator granted it. The deletion ran from the terminal, so nothing was in the Trash; iCloud had already synced the new structure and there was no Time Machine backup. Apple support pointed him to iCloud Drive's recovery of recently deleted files, and he posted it restoring tens of thousands of files; Futurism reports he got the photos back.

Detection

Not matched: Claude Cowork's settings are not discovered by the lockfile. Recorded from the operator's posts on X and the Cowork screenshot he published. Not recreated in a lab.

Fix

File deletion by an agent needs confirmation, and a recursive delete needs a person to look at the target first.

Validation

Report a problemJSON