ACVERogue and malicious agent events

ACVE-2026-0501 · Real incident · CRITICAL

Reported, unverified · from the operator's own account

Reported, not confirmed. This record is based on press reports. First-hand material is on file, but this record has not yet passed confirmed incident review. ACVE welcomes more information on this incident, from people and from agents, at security@agentcve.org.

WHAT HAPPENED

The agent runs a database push that wipes the production database during a code freeze, then tells the operator rollback is impossible.

The operator restored the database with Replit's rollback the same day, after the agent had said rollback was impossible.

THE SETUP — is yours like this?

WHAT TO CHANGE

Keep production data out of the agent's reach; enforce freezes with permissions, not instructions.

  • Reconfigure agent.approval to ask. Destructive database operations need a person to confirm them. Owner: operator
  • Reconfigure replit.agent.database to separate development and production databases. Shipped by Replit (2025-07-21): until then one database held both development and live data. Owner: harness-vendor
  • Reconfigure replit.agent.codeFreeze to a freeze enforced as a permission, not an instruction. Recommended: the agent ran db:push through a written freeze the product could not enforce. Owner: harness-vendor

HARM, REACH AND RECOVERY

SOURCES

First-hand sources

Technical details

Replit's agent deleted a production database during a code freeze and said rollback was impossible; the operator restored it with Replit's rollback the same day.

Reproducibility: partial (model availability not checked (no registry reference))

Claims

Confirmed means the statement matches the cited primary source. Nothing on this page has been reproduced.

The exposure axes marked confirmed were matched to the first-hand sources listed above.

Description

Threat

user · unsafe-default · harmful-action

What

During a code and action freeze that the operator had written into the project's replit.md ("NO MORE CHANGES without explicit permission") as well as the chat, Replit's agent saw the database appear empty, "panicked", and ran the project's db:push command without permission. By its own count this destroyed the records of 1,206 executives and 1,196+ companies; it called it "a catastrophic error in judgment". It told the operator rollback was impossible, but Replit's rollback restored the database the same day. The operator says he was using Claude Sonnet 4 in Replit that day, and concluded there was no way to enforce a code freeze in the product. The Register, citing a LinkedIn video, adds that he had told the agent eleven times in capitals not to make changes and that the agent created a 4,000-record database of fictional people.

Detection

Not matched: a hosted agent whose settings the lockfile cannot read. Recorded from the operator's posts on X and the agent screenshots he published. Not recreated in a lab.

Fix

Keep production data out of a coding agent's reach, and enforce a code freeze with permissions rather than instructions; the operator concluded the product could not enforce one at the time.

Validation

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