ACVEAgent configuration vulnerability registry

Advisories › ACVE-2026-0415

ACVE-2026-0415

Vidar variant steals OpenClaw gateway and device secrets

Severity
CRITICAL
Status
Unverified
Kind
Code
Published
—
Modified
2026-09-20
Aliases
No CVE assigned — No CVE assigned; this record describes a configuration or supply-chain condition.
Affected
  • AgentHarness: openclaw — all versions
Harness/product
openclaw
Classes
credential-theft; CWE-522
Taxonomy
Not specified
Licence
CC-BY-4.0 advisories; MIT code

Part of campaign: Agent credential stealers

In the wild

exploited-itw · 2026-02-13 – 2026-02-16 · dfir

Description

What

A Vidar variant was reported collecting OpenClaw gateway and device material, including openclaw.json, device keys, and context files such as soul.md, AGENTS.md, and MEMORY.md. The source names one confirmed OpenClaw user; it does not establish a broader infection population.

Which configuration is exposed

The target set is any host running OpenClaw with readable gateway tokens, device keys, and personal context files. ACVE can identify the harness presence but cannot determine whether malware infected the host or whether a file was opened.

How ACVE detects it

The matcher flags an OpenClaw harness as a target-set review signal. It intentionally does not claim infection, because discovery does not read credential contents and the published sample used generic token and private-key sweeps.

Fix

Revoke gateway tokens and device keys, sign out connected services, inspect persistence, and restore context files from a trusted backup. Treat the endpoint as compromised and issue fresh short-lived credentials after containment.

Grounding needed

The DFIR page should be checked for the confirmed-user statement, file list, and infection date. ACVE can only flag the presence of a target harness, not prove this host was infected.

This record is limited to the condition named in the public source: Vidar variant steals OpenClaw gateway and device secrets. A match is a review signal for that condition, not a claim that every installation, package, model, or host was compromised. Operators should preserve the resolved evidence and investigate adjacent credentials, network exposure, and execution history before closing the finding. The result should be retained with the lock snapshot used for the match so later review can distinguish configuration drift from a changed public record.

Configuration

harness.id in ["openclaw"]

Fix

Rotate OpenClaw gateway tokens and device keys after infection.

  • Reconfigure harness.id. Treat an infected OpenClaw host as compromised.
  • Remove ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json and device.json. Remove stolen token material after revocation.

Validation

No validation entries recorded.

Grounding

No grounding checks recorded.

References

No references recorded.

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