ACVE-2026-0207
DeepSeek V3.1 and Kimi K2 reach 5.5% and 5.8% per-attempt IPI ASR.
The configuration
- Configuration label
- model.family deepseek-v3.1|kimi-k2 | family deepseek-v3.1|kimi-k2 + untrustedInput=true + sideEffect=true + approval never|allowlist
- Affected entries
Model: deepseek-v3.1 — ECOSYSTEM (introduced 0)
- Matcher
- all
- any
- all
model.idexistsmodel.familyin[ "deepseek-v3.1", "kimi-k2" ]
- some models
familyin[ "deepseek-v3.1", "kimi-k2" ]
- all
- all
- some tools
untrustedInputeqtrue
- some tools
sideEffecteqtrue
- some tools
approvalin[ "never", "allowlist" ]
- any
- all
Threat
- Attacker
- content-author
- Vector
- prompt-injection
- Outcome
- harmful-action
Evidence
| Benchmark | Metric | Value | n | Setup | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 IPI competition | asr | 0.055 | — | auto; live tool, coding, and computer-use agents | https://arxiv.org/html/2603.15714 |
| 2026 IPI competition | asr | 0.058 | — | auto; live tool, coding, and computer-use agents | https://arxiv.org/html/2603.15714 |
| 2026 IPI pooled tool-use surface | asr | 0.0482 | — | auto; live tool-use agents | https://arxiv.org/html/2603.15714 |
| 2026 IPI comparison | asr | 0.005 | — | auto; live tool, coding, and computer-use agents | https://arxiv.org/html/2603.15714 |
| 2026 IPI comparison | asr | 0.006 | — | auto; live tool-use agents | https://arxiv.org/html/2603.15714 |
| 2026 IPI comparison | asr | 0.011 | — | auto; live computer-use agents | https://arxiv.org/html/2603.15714 |
Why it is exploitable
What the vulnerability is
The 2026 Gray Swan IPI competition reports 5.5% per-attempt ASR for DeepSeek V3.1 and 5.8% for Kimi K2 across tool, coding, and computer-use agents. R7 also gives pooled surface rates of 4.82% for tool use, 3.13% for computer use, and 2.51% for coding. Claude Opus 4.5 is a useful comparison at 0.5% overall, with 0.6% on tool use and 1.1% on computer use. The competition uses live agent surfaces, unlike ASB-style simulations.
Which configuration is exposed
The match is about open-weight model suppliers as deployed in agents that read attacker-controlled pages, issues, email, or MCP results and can then perform side effects. A concrete case is a DeepSeek V3.1 or Kimi K2 endpoint attached to a browser plus ticketing or shell tool with automatic approval. Tool egress is especially important for secrets; a purely read-only analysis agent is not the same exposure even when it receives untrusted text.
How ACVE detects it
ACVE accepts either family on model.id or in models[], then requires untrustedInput and sideEffect tool entries and approval never or allowlist. A dated provider identity plus complete tool list can confirm the finding. A floating API alias or an agent server with unknown tools is possible only. Safeguards such as a hosted classifier do not appear in the lock unless discovery records them, so the model family match is not a claim that every managed surface has the same rate.
Fix
- Set agent.approval to ask for every side-effecting operation. 2. If a model change is practical, use Claude Opus 4.5 or another pinned model and validate the same surface; Opus 4.5 is 0.5% overall in the cited competition versus 5.5% and 5.8% here. 3. Keep browser, coding, and tool-use results separate because pooled numbers hide surface differences. 4. Add an output classifier before enabling autonomous writes.
Grounding needed
Pin the DeepSeek V3.1 and Kimi K2 provider model ids, date, quantisation where local, competition commit or released test set, attack strings, seeds, surface, approval, and live tool policy. R7 confidence is H for the competition rates, but each is per-attempt and does not show a k=10 or k=100 curve. A reproduction should therefore report both the per-attempt rate and repeated-attempt ASR before deciding whether approval can be relaxed.
Underlying CVEs / aliases
No CVE assigned. behavioural — no code defect; evidence is an evaluation
Detect
npx @pickbitsai/acve audit
For CI, emit SARIF with npx @pickbitsai/acve audit --format sarif --out acve.sarif --apply and upload it with GitHub code scanning.
Fix
Require approval and prefer a pinned lower-ASR model for these agent surfaces.
| Action | Target | To | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| reconfigure | agent.approval | ask | A human decision is needed before a live agent turns content into an effect. |
| reconfigure | agent.model | claude-opus-4-5 | The competition comparison is 0.5% for Opus 4.5 versus 5.5% and 5.8% for the affected models. |
Validation
No validation entries recorded.
Grounding
No grounding checks recorded.